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Abstract
This paper explores various dimensions of cloud computing security. It argues that security concerns of cloud computing
need to be addressed from the perspective of individual stakeholder. Security focuses of cloud computing are essentially dif-
ferent in terms of its characteristics and business model. Conventional way of viewing as well as addressing security such as
‘bolting-in’ on the top of cloud computing may not work well. The paper attempts to portray the security spectrum necessary
for enterprizes to understand the dynamics of cloud computing security, the relationships between security requirements of
different stakeholders at different levels of abstraction, and the challenges it poses. The paper is expected to shed some lights
on concerns as well as dynamics of cloud computing security.
1 Introduction
The main idea of cloud computing has evolved from cluster computing, grid computing, component based composition,
and lately, service oriented architecture (SOA) and Web services. In cloud computing, everything is considered service
such as hardware, software, CPU power, storage, platform, application software etc. Many leading enterprizes have enough
reasons to believe that cloud computing is not mere hype. Main cloud computing providers include Microsofts Azure,
GoGrid, Google Apps, XCalibre Communications, Amazon Web Services, Salesforce.com, AppNexus, GridLayer, Mosso
and so on. Cloud computing provides a blending of application-deployment speed, fast prototyping capabilities, cost savings,
virtually infinite computing power and capacity as well as great unknown and uncertainty about security. It is not entirely
a new technology, rather it is a paradigm shift to a new enterprize distributed computing. Cloud computing is considered a
computing paradigm shift from mainframe computers to cloud computing over the past decades [7].
Cloud computing is expected to provide an illusion of simplicity and convenience to the enterprizes. If an enterprize needs
more storage space, more CPU power, intensive computation and high volume of data processing, or a couple of database
servers, cloud computing can provide these capabilities without the enterprize having to install new servers, buy powerful
computer with huge storage capacity, and of course the related application software [3]. When the enterprize no longer needs
those extra capacity and computing power, it can decide to discontinue the services at any time, and switch it off. The question
is: does it that simple? Not really, as long as its security is concerned. The complexities and security concerns of services
delivered by cloud computing are not entirely negligible. There is no shortage of published literature on the benefits that the
cloud computing could bring to enterprizes. One can easily find plenty of materials explaining what a cloud computing is
and its numerous benefits. On the contrary, whenever someone wanders to find out any real insights of security issues of this
paradigm, there are hardly many. There are two possible explanations for this. Firstly, many probably think that the cloud
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computing security is not much different than existing security practices, therefore nothing to worry about. Secondly, we are
not sure yet about the actual security concerns that need to be tackled in cloud computing. This paper attempts to explore
these.
Most cloud providers try to satisfy potential cloud consumers by stating that they use SSL for all communications to
protect network traffic, they use encryption, they designed trusted virtual domains, cloud specific access control technology
in place in their cloud domains, etc. The main concerns of CIOs are possibly more than technological issue of traditional
security and threats of cloud computing. Their central worries include possible data breaches, accidental intermixing of their
data assets with other consumers of the cloud provider, great uncertainty about data privacy and vulnerability issues, and
lack of control on their data assets while these residing in third-party hardware-software infrastructure. These concerns are
partly due to the unique characteristics of cloud computing and the great unknown about its security issues. Cloud computing
themselves unlikely cause the security problems as most of us are too worried about. Security issues of cloud computing are
not the technology, rather it is the issue of reliability, confidence, lack of clear and enough information about cloud security.
In order to understand the right issues in cloud computing security, we need to understand the entire spectrum of its
stakeholders and their security concerns. Sensitive data processed by a third party in a remote machine as well application
would undoubtedly introduce inherent level of security risk, because such third party services may take away the very controls
of cloud computing consumers on their data assets. Cloud consumers may demand transparency such as detailed information
on security functions and assurances provided by cloud computing providers. In general, a cloud computing consumer can
believe that the password based security is reasonably protecting her desktop browser. However, when her application is using
a cloud service, browser security becomes a critical organizational security factor [6]. A consumer may like to know where
her data is stored, who owns and control the sites, what data manipulation accesses are available to third party employees,
any audit trail is available, how to invoke the data manipulation access remotely and so on [1].
Cloud computing security is increasingly getting importance. As a result, National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) has announced to create a Cloud Computing Security Group. The group is to oversee the cloud computing security
issue, securing cloud infrastructure, security cloud applications, enabling forensics in the cloud, security monitoring in a
cloud, security compliances etc. The usual practice of putting a mere security tag such as ‘secure’ on the cloud computing
marketing slogan does not help much to boost cloud consumers confidence in the cloud computing. The term ‘secure’ is over
used and somehow misleading because it does not state the specific type of security ensured.
This paper makes an attempt to unfold the specific security problems that cloud computing suffers from. In order to
understand the security dynamics of this issue, section 2 identifies various levels of abstractions in cloud computing and their
associated stakeholders. Section 3 discusses security concerns of each stakeholder group, and maps out the existing security
practices. Section 4 outlines the challenges to address the security issues identified in section 3. Finally, section 5 closes with
some concluding remarks.
2 Cloud stakeholders
Cloud computing can have various types of stakeholder at different levels of its abstraction. We can identify three different
levels of abstraction in cloud computing: cloud infrastructure providers, cloud service providers, and cloud consumers. At
the back-end, the cloud infrastructure providers typically own and manage cloud computing resources such as hardware,
networks, systems software etc. Cloud service providers serve the front-end cloud consumers by offering services such as
on-demand computing, utility computing, data processing, software services and platform for developing application soft-
ware. Cloud consumers at the front-end of cloud computing can be classified into two major groups: (i) end-users who use
on-demand computing, software services as well as utility services; and (ii) application developers who need software devel-
opment platform as well as hardware software infrastructure to construct software on the fly. This classification represents
entire cloud computing into three levels of abstraction with four different major stakeholders as depicted in Fig. 1.
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Figure 1. Three Levels of Abstractions and Stakeholders of Cloud Computing
• At the back-end of cloud computing, cloud infrastructure providers own, manage, and maintain hardware and sys-
tems software required for generating the cloud computing power. The infrastructure is based on Internet-connected
servers, storage, virtualization, grid of distributed servers, multiple blade servers, APIs with Web services, XML-based
protocols to connect users over the Internet, multiple nodes of processor etc. Amazon, IBM, Sun Microsystem offer
infrastructure supports such as storage, processors, and virtual servers. IBM’s Research Compute Cloud provides an
on-demand globally accessible set of computing resources which are distributed across its several labs.
• At the front-end of cloud computing, cloud service providers offer services such as high volume computation, virus
scanning, anti-spam services, desktop management services, email services, databases, software development plat-
form, and data storage. Providers are the ISVs who offer various computing services directly to cloud consumers. For
services, cloud service providers use software running on hardware-software resources managed by back-end cloud in-
frastructure providers. Companies like Salesforce.com, Amazon.com, and Google have developed various on-demand
services to enterprizes. A cloud provider could also play the role of cloud infrastructure. Everything goes on behind
the scenes of the services such as the server, operating system, the programming language services, software tools,
utility programs used are abstracted away from the cloud consumers.
• End-users are the front-end stakeholders of the service level abstraction. They consume services provided by cloud
service and infrastructure providers. End-users usually use Web browsers or other user interface software to access
cloud services. The services include from data storage to high volume computation. End-users use the services and
‘pay as they go’. The business enterprizes or corporations are the main end-users of cloud services.
• Application developers can build software on the fly without investing in additional software and hardware devices. A
large scale application software sometimes needs to increase its computing capacity or add more functionalities. Cloud
infrastructure providers offer real-time computing resources, and cloud service providers offer development environ-
ment as a service over the Internet to cloud application developers who do not control the development infrastructure.
The vendors provide the platform, the application developers decide what development tools such as compiler, li-
braries, components, hardware will be used for their applications. Examples of this type of application development
platforms include Sun Grid, Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2), Salesforce.com’s Force.com, GRIDS Lab, Aneka,
Coghead, Google App Engine, Yahoo Pipes, Dapper.net etc. The idea behind platform as a service is that resources
are made available for building whole applications as components, rather than programs to be written. Widgets, web
editors, pre-built shopping carts, whatever pieces application developers need could be offered by a single ISV for the
application developer to match and compose at will.
Cloud computing potentially raises various types of security concerns at different levels of abstraction to different stakehold-
ers as discussed in the next section.
3 Cloud Computing Security
Security of cloud computing can be viewed through numerous lenses. One of the leses is the perspective of stakeholders.
Each of the stakeholders has its own security concerns and objectives. These security objectives are associated with specific
services that they provide or consume. We note that a cloud is not a single entity, it can consist of one or more open
clouds, internal clouds or external clouds. There is no doubt that new security risks arise from the communication that goes
on between cloud consumers and cloud providers; and between cloud providers and cloud infrastructure providers. The
cloud security promotes de-perimeterization of the enterprize data security boundary, and extends it to greater mobility and
collaboration with third party enterprizes [2]. In order to understand this phenomena as well as the cloud computing security
concerns, consider the following three scenarios.
1. Scenario 1: A medical practitioner MediScan, a cloud end-user, consumes computing services offered by a cloud
service provider CloudX . The service is to process the patients’ digital medical images such as CT scan, MRI,
ultrasound. The confidentiality and integrity of images are very important for MediScan, but are beyond its control,
rather CloudX is responsible for all these. It goes further. The huge volume of images are finally stored in several
physical storage facilities owned and managed by a cloud infrastructure providerCloudBon. MediScan likes to know
from CloudX about its specific security concerns: How (i) confidentiality of images is kept, (ii) integrity is preserved,
and (iii) to control read-write access of others to its data. How these are ensured at different levels of abstraction in
relation to the service it consumes from CloudX .
2. Scenario 2: A second cloud end-user, a media companyNewsMedia, uses the same cloud service providerCloudX’s
computing services to process various images such as news clips and pictures of its clients. The confidentiality of the
images is not important for NewsMedia because all images are publicly available. However, the integrity of images
is very important for NewsMedia but beyond its control, rather CloudX is responsible for protecting the images.
CloudX stores some of the images in the devices owned and managed by the cloud infrastructure providerCloudBon.
NewsMedia does not care who can see and copy its images, but it wants to know from CloudX about its specific
security requirements: How (i) integrity of its images is preserved; (ii) authentication of CloudX is maintained, and
(iii) non-repudiation is ensured for all communications between NewsMedia and CloudX . In other words, the
images should not be allowed to be tampered or modified by any unauthorized entities (integrity), and CloudX cannot
deny later that it did not perform the operation to CloudX (non repudiation).
3. Scenario 3: SofTech, an application developer, uses software development platform offered by CloudX . SofTech
basically composes software with some of its existing software components, new components and utilities provided by
CloudX . The main two concerns of SofTech are: (i) how the security requirements of its application software are
complied with the security assurances of the new components and utilities available from CloudX’s platform. It also
likes to know how the security properties of its existing software components are supported by the security provisions
offered by CloudX; (ii) what are the assurances that the claimed security of the software components and utilities
provided by CloudX will always hold; and (iii) an assurance that the software components do not have problems of
information leakage and buffer overflows.
Fig. 2 shows these scenarios with the security objectives of the stakeholders. In the following sub-sections, we discuss the
main security concerns of each stakeholder in these three scenarios.
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Figure 2. Security objectives of different stakeholders
3.1 Security concerns of end-users
The scenarios suggest that the main security concerns of the stakeholder MediScan are confidentiality, lose of control
on their digital images, and unknown security profiles of third part providers such as CloudX and CloudBon. MediScan
sees that its images are hosted and stored on someone else like CloudX’s servers and CloudBon’s hardware-software
infrastructure. It finds losing its control over its data assets. MediScan has also no control to check the security assurances
a prior to the service of CloudX and CloudBon. The problem is compounded with the fact that the service adds additional
communication links in the chain, that is, CloudBon in this case. This third party inclusion in the service introduces an
additional vectors of attack [4]. This additional link includes entrusting third party such as CloudBon in the chain. The
MediScan’s data are not only transmitted to CloudX , and further to CloudBon, rather they are persistently stored there.
In such cases, data might not be adequately protected while they are being moved within the systems or across multiple sites
owned by multiple ISVs [5]. MediScan and NewsMedia may wonder: are data persistently encrypted, or only encrypted
while being moved over the network? How to control the access of others to their own data? How to manage the images split
across multiple third party ISV providers?
In first two scenarios, we can find that two different end-users namely MediScan and NewsMedia have two different
sets of security requirements for the same service offered by the same cloud service provider CloudX . It signifies the fact
that in cloud computing one security does not fit all. This scenario also suggests that the security assurances associated with
a cloud service could be customized according to the needs of the consumers. At the lowest level of the abstraction, these
requirements are to be complied such as cloud infrastructure provider should synchronize and ensure the different sets of
security requirements surfaced at the front-end level of cloud computing. Similarly, the application software must support
various security needs requested for the same cloud service. MediScan and NewsMedia need to be ensured by CloudX
that CloudBon provides same level of security standards as CloudX .
3.2 Security concerns of application developer
The cloud application developer SofTech is more interested in the compositional impact and conformity of security
properties of their application running on infrastructure managed by CloudBon. SofTech should know specific security as-
surances provided by CloudX and CloudBon. In a highly fluid distributed environment such as cloud computing, SofTech
develops applications on platform and infrastructure provided by CloudX and CloudBon respectively of which they have
only partial or no knowledge about the underlying security properties. Their concerns may include: does the application soft-
ware built on the SofTech’s platform somehow leaks information to other devices? How is the buffer overflow controlled?
How is the security policies defined by the CloudX and CloudBon preserved and honored at the application level?
3.3 Security concerns of cloud service provider
The cloud service provider CloudX’s main concern of safeguarding the MediScan’s and NewsMedia’s data is trans-
ferring images from devices and servers within the control of MediScan and NewsMedia to its devices, and subsequently
images stored in CloudBon. It requires CloudX a kind of remote management of MediScan’s images and ensuring secu-
rity. Images stored in cloud provider CloudX’s devices are not located on a single machine, rather, these are saved across the
entire virtual layer. The data are also hosted on devices that belong to third party ISV CloudBon. CloudX needs to ensure
its consumers MediScan and NewsMedia on how the security issues of images are addressed between the partners: does
CloudBon ensure similar level of security of CloudX? How is the clean-up of outdated images managed at its site and the
site of CloudBon?
3.4 Security concerns of cloud infrastructure provider
ForCloudBon, the cloud infrastructure provider, the security concerns are undoubtedly not less thanMediScan,NewsMedia,
or CloudX . CloudBon knows that a single point of failure in its infrastructure security mechanisms would let the hackers
take out thousands of images owned by MediScan and NewsMedia, probably also images owned by other enterprizes.
Their concerns are: how are the data stored in its physical devices protected? How is the backup of images managed, cleaned
up, and controlled at its site? How to ensure the access control to the physical devices and images stored on its devices?
4 Cloud computing challenges
The existing security technologies can take care of most of the security concerns unfolded in the previous section.
• Network security: The communication between MediScan and CloudX should be secure. The current security
technology provides plenty of security protocols and provisions for network security. There is no new or unique
network security problem in cloud computing in this case.
• Confidentiality and integrity: Encrypting a data file before it’s sent to cloud computing services can secure the images
of MediScan and NewsMedia. The existing security techniques can scramble the image file such a way that it can
only be accessed with a password. However, encrypted images can only be accessed by the user –regardless of where
the file is stored. The stored images could be protected by using encryption. A cloud provider can protect data in transit
by encrypting it in the pipe between the provider and the service consumers system.
• Non-repudiation and authenticity: These security aspects can be well managed with existing techniques such as digital
signature, PKI, encryption etc.
Encryption, digital signature, network security, all are important for cloud computing, but these won’t make cloud computing
more reliable to the consumers. It needs something more in addition to conventional security mechanisms. Cloud consumers
may wonder: what is the actual problem in cloud computing security when the network is secure, the password appears to be
working, the encryption is working, and keys seem to be strong? The answer to this question probably lies with some new
technical as well as some non-technical challenges of cloud security.
4.1 Technical challenges
The technical issues include non-disclosing specific security assurances of a service as opposed to claiming ‘secure’ ser-
vice, lack of control of data owner, and absence of security compliances between service level functions of service consumers
and cloud providers. A lack of control on data assets triggers the issue of confidence and reliability. The following specific
technical challenges need to be addressed in order to make cloud computing viable to consumers:
• Security profiling of services which could be available to end-users and verifiable.
• Consumers have the capability of controlling others’ access to data remotely irrespective of locations and systems.
Consumers like to have fine grained access control on their own data irrespective where its data assets are located and
processed.
• Security compliances between consumers systems and cloud providers systems, and
• Security assurances of software-hardware as claimed, better certification is to be provided.
Our further work on this paper is expected to address the above four challenges in near future.
4.2 Non-technical challenges
The three scenarios also suggest that in addition to these technical challenges, the cloud computing probably is to address
some non-technical aspects of the identified security concerns, mostly the psychological one. The great unknown about
cloud security and its service dynamics are the driving instrument for the psychological issue of uncertainty and confidence
problem in cloud computing. In security field, it is known that to make a data asset secure, one must separate the asset from
the threat. On the contrary, data assets are taken closer to their threats in cloud computing because the assets are transmitted
to, stored, and manipulated in remote devices by third parties, not by the owner of the data asset. When a cloud computing
consumer finds that she does not have clear idea in where her enterprize data is processed, how her persistent as well as
transient data are protected while being processed, transmitted and stored by machines controlled by others not related to her
enterprize, she has valid reason to be concerned about cloud computing. By computer security definition, a remote location
not controlled by the asset owner may usually be associated with multiple threat scenarios. This is one of the reasons for
why the psychological aspect of cloud security is so strong among the cloud consumers. The end-users license agreement
(EULA) or some privacy policies may not solve this psychological issue.
In this brief discussion we can see that no one-size security fits for all stakeholders. The security requirements of cloud
consumers need to be ensured by the cloud provider’s security assurances. Similarly, the cloud providers’ security promises
to consumers must be guaranteed by the infrastructure providers. The security requirements of four different stakeholders of
cloud computing are interdependent and need to be integrated in a business model.
5 Conclusion
Cloud computing provides consumers the choices of software, hardware, and computing environment. This choice pro-
vision could be extended further to include security assurances. The ultimate cost for a service could be well based on the
choice of service as well as the choice of security assurances. In order to mature the cloud services, service level agreement
(SLA) needs to specify the preferred specific security assurances in details. The security concerns of cloud computing are
very much based on consumers’ concerns. The characteristics of cloud computing security are somehow different than the
conventional software systems in several ways. In this new design paradigm, change of mind is crucial because data belongs
to end-users, therefore, they need to control it. Nowadays, cloud consumers are more security-aware than before. They make
the service consuming decision not only on cost and functionality of the service, but they like to see the real credible security
that cloud providers ensure. Cloud consumers may demand the proof of security assurance and certificate of the services
before they lock in any deal in cloud services. Generally speaking, it is somehow unrealistic to tell cloud consumers whether
a cloud system is secure or not; it is better to expose the security profiles of specific service to them. Based on this, end-users
could map out which tasks could be consigned to the cloud and which should be kept under their control. This decision could
be made based on the value of their data assets and the risks involved in cloud computing. Our repeated experiences suggest
that just relying on security claims made by cloud providers, such as secure cloud, may not be very appealing to all cloud
consumers. A blanket security assurance may not satisfy all types of cloud stakeholders. We need to do more to attain and
sustain the consumers’ confidence in cloud computing.
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